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No. 135  |  August 21, 2014
 n Congress has created an aver-
age of 56 new crimes every year 
since 2000, roughly the same 
rate as in the two prior decades.
 n Federal judges have repeatedly 
used ambiguous statutes as a basis 
for creating new federal crimes 
and have expanded the reach of 
overlapping federal crimes to drive 
up the punishment for compara-
tively minor federal crimes.
 n The rule of lenity requires a court 
to construe ambiguous criminal 
laws narrowly, in favor of the 
defendant, not to show lenience 
to lawbreakers, but to protect 
important societal interests 
against the many adverse conse-
quences that the judicial expan-
sion of crimes produces.
 n The state-of-mind, or mens 
rea, requirements are vital to 
preventing morally undeserved 
punishment and guaranteeing 
the fair warning necessary to 
enable law-abiding citizens to 
avoid committing crimes.
 n Although comprehensive legisla-
tive reform is ultimately needed 
to reverse overcriminalization, 
the reform effort can and should 
take place in federal courtrooms 
as well as in Congress.
Abstract
The dangers of “overcriminalization” are widely appreciated across 
the political spectrum, but confusion remains as to its cause. Standard 
critiques fault legislatures alone. The problem, however, is not simply 
that too many criminal laws are on the books, but that they are poorly 
defined in ways that give unwarranted sweep to the criminal law, rais-
ing the danger of punishment absent or in excess of moral blamewor-
thiness. Instead of narrowing ambiguous criminal laws to more appro-
priate bounds, courts frequently expand them, even when this ratchets 
up the punishment that offenders face, and fail to insist on proof of 
sufficiently culpable states of mind to render the resulting punishment 
just. By changing how they interpret criminal statutes, taking narrow 
construction principles and state-of-mind requirements more serious-
ly, courts can help to cure the overcriminalization disease.
A s issues of public policy go, few are as strange as overcriminal- ization. Once largely the subject only of academic complaint, 
the problems associated with overcriminalization are now more 
widely understood. Major think tanks,1 media outlets,2 civil liber-
tarian groups,3 and legal professional associations4 have shined a 
harsh light on the injustices that federal prosecutors have commit-
ted against people who had no reason to know their actions were 
wrongful, much less illegal.
these are not isolated cases of abusive prosecution; they take 
place from coast to coast and have ruined the lives and reputations 
of people who were like other law-abiding citizens except for their 
misfortune of having attracted the attention of an overzealous fed-
eral agent or prosecutor.5 From left and right of political center to 
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/lm135
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage 
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
2LEGAL MEMORANDUM | NO. 135
August 21, 2014  
points in between, there is an impressive consensus 
that overcriminalization gravely threatens the lib-
erty of ordinary citizens.
Nevertheless, reports of overcriminalization’s 
demise would be greatly exaggerated. Congress has 
repeatedly held hearings on the subject, and mem-
bers of both parties have criticized the present state 
of affairs in which the law virtually “makes everyone 
a felon.”6 Yet Congress has taken no action.
Even that bleak statement is too optimistic: 
Congress, while at times professing concern over 
the federalization of crime,7 has continued to pass 
new federal criminal laws at a relentless pace. Con-
gress has created an average of 56 new crimes every 
year since 2000, roughly the same rate of crimi-
nalization from the two prior decades.8 this is no 
aberration. As Professor John Baker has noted, “for 
the past 25 years, a period over which the growth of 
the federal criminal law has come under increasing 
scrutiny, Congress has been creating over 500 new 
crimes per decade.”9
Much like the addict who repeatedly breaks 
promises to quit, Congress cannot seem to kick the 
overcriminalization habit. some addicts eventually 
seek help through third-party “interventions,” but 
the federal courts, committed as they are to expan-
1. For example, The Heritage Foundation has played a leading role in the overcriminalization debate, establishing the Overcriminalization Project 
to educate lawmakers and citizens on the subject. See The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization,  
http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization (last visited May 28, 2014). Heritage has also published a series of reports 
documenting the problems associated with overcriminalization and proposing common-sense reforms. See, e.g., One Nation Under Arrest: 
How Crazy Laws, Rogue Prosecutors, and Activist Judges Threaten Your Liberty (2d ed. 2013) (Paul Rosenzweig ed.); Brian Walsh & 
Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010).
2. Major newspapers and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, have carried news and opinion pieces in recent 
years on overcriminalization. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, Wall St. J. 
(Sept. 27, 2011); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, Wall St. J. (July 23, 2011); Adam Liptak, 
Right and Left Join Forces to Take on U.S. in Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. Times, at A1 (Nov. 24, 2009). See also, e.g., Ed Feulner, “The Trial,” American 
Style: Who Can Avoid Running Afoul of Overcriminalization? Wash. Times, at B3 (Aug. 13, 2013); Wendy Kaminer, When Everyone Is an Offender, 
The Atlantic (Sept. 28, 2011); Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, The Economist (July 22, 2010).
3. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) includes overcriminalization reform as part of its Mass Incarceration project.
4. The American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) have long been critical of 
overcriminalization at the federal level. In 1998, an ABA task force issued a report decrying the steady expansion of federal criminal laws. 
See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998). The ABA remains active in calling attention to the costs of 
overcriminalization. See American Bar Association, Task Force on Overcriminalization, American bar Association,  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html (last visited May 27, 2014). The NACDL has consistently 
urged Congress to enact sweeping reforms to counteract the adverse effects of overcriminalization. See, e.g., Defining the Problem and Scope 
of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong (2013) (testimony of Steven D. Benjamin, President, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
5. The Heritage Foundation has created what might be called an “Overcriminalization Hall of Shame,” a list of documented cases nationwide in 
which federal prosecutors have convicted people who inadvertently ran afoul of obscure federal laws. See  
http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization. A sampling of these stories has been collected and published by members of an 
Overcriminalization Working Group, comprised of Heritage, the ACLU, and other respected opponents of overcriminalization, in USA v. YOU: 
The Flood of Criminal Laws Affecting Your Liberty.
6. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001). This idea, previously known mainly to criminal law 
“insiders,” captured the attention of the public with the publication of Harvey A. Silverglate’s widely publicized exposé, Three Felonies a Day: 
How the Feds Target the Innocent (2009). As his title indicates, Silverglate’s thesis is that American criminal laws are so broadly and poorly 
defined that ordinary, well-meaning citizens unwittingly commit multiple felonies on a daily basis and thus are exposed to indictment and 
conviction at the whim of federal agents and prosecutors.
7. In 2013 alone, for example, the Congressional Task Force on Overcriminalization held three different hearings addressing concerns about the 
overly broad nature of federal criminal liability.
8. See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 26, at 5 (June 16, 2008). 
The ABA’s Task Force on Federalization found that fully 40 percent of the thousands of federal criminal laws in force were enacted after 1970. 
See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998).
9. Baker, supra note 8, at 2.
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sive views of congressional power to define crimes,10 
will not nudge Congress even to curb its reliance on 
overcriminalization, much less to quit cold turkey.
At this point, traditional critiques of overcrimi-
nalization hit a brick wall because overcriminal-
ization is understood primarily in quantitative 
terms: the notion that there are too many criminal 
laws regulating too many activities. From this view, 
reform efforts depend entirely on Congress, which 
needs to narrow and repeal scores of federal crimi-
nal laws. Absent such legislative action, federal pros-
ecutors will continue to have free rein to exploit the 
vagaries of federal law to charge and convict whom-
ever they wish, regardless of how innocuous the 
accused’s behavior is.
Fortunately, there is another path to reform in 
this area, one that does not depend on congres-
sional action (or heroic self-restraint by federal 
prosecutors). this path to reform is informed stat-
utory interpretation in federal criminal cases. Leg-
islative overuse and prosecutorial misuse of the 
criminal sanction need not go unchecked, as many 
judges seem to think. the courts themselves have an 
important role in defining crimes, a role that takes 
on even greater importance as Congress continues 
to default on its obligation to restrict criminal liabil-
ity and penalties to sensible bounds.
Courts flesh out—and, more often than not, 
prescribe in the first instance—the state of mind 
required for conviction. the state-of-mind, or mens 
rea, requirements are of vital importance in prevent-
ing morally undeserved punishment and guarantee-
ing the fair warning necessary to enable law-abiding 
citizens to avoid committing crimes. As important 
as the role of defining the mental element of crimi-
nal liability is, however, it is not the judiciary’s only 
role in this area. the courts also help to define crim-
inal liability by interpreting ambiguous statutes, 
determining the meaning of laws in which Congress 
failed to make its intention entirely clear.
Once the important role of the federal judiciary 
in defining criminal liability is understood, there 
is greater cause for optimism about the prospect of 
finally reining in overcriminalization. the effort to 
persuade Congress to reverse course and exercise 
greater restraint and care in the use of criminal 
sanction is important and should continue. It is time, 
however, to broaden the conversation to include the 
one branch of the federal government—the judicia-
ry—that is most likely to be receptive to long-stand-
ing complaints about overcriminalization. As we 
continue to await legislative reform, it is high time 
for courts to be part of the solution to overcriminal-
ization instead of part of the problem.
the rest of this paper proceeds as follows. the first 
section seeks to reframe the typical discussion of 
overcriminalization in terms of the deeper problems 
stemming from the expansive body of federal crimi-
nal law. these problems, which stem fundamentally 
from poor crime definition, are ones that the federal 
courts helped to create and thus can remedy on their 
own without action by Congress. Although compre-
hensive legislative reform is ultimately needed, the 
reform effort can and should take place in federal 
courtrooms as well as in the chambers of Congress.
the second and third sections discuss the ways 
in which courts have worsened—and, by changing 
interpretive strategies, can counter—the adverse 
effects of overcriminalization through statutory 
interpretation. It is not “restraint” for courts to 
expand ambiguous federal criminal statutes and to 
water down mens rea requirements. to the contrary, 
it is “activism” and an abdication of the judiciary’s 
historic responsibility to promote due process and 
equal justice for all.
to be faithful to its role as a coequal branch of 
government, the federal judiciary should not be 
rubber stamps for the Department of Justice’s pre-
dictably expansive uses of federal criminal statutes. 
the judiciary should instead counteract the per-
sonal, political, and other considerations that often 
sway prosecutorial decision making with informed, 
dispassionate judgment about the proper scope of 
federal criminal laws in light of statutory text, leg-
islative intent, and enduring principles of criminal 
law. the sooner federal judges get the message, the 
10. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 881 & n.2 (2005) (hereinafter Smith, Proportionality and 
Federalization) (noting that constitutional law does not limit, and indeed facilitates, the federalization of crime). The main culprit here, of 
course, is the Commerce Clause, which even after the so-called New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court allows Congress to regulate even 
the most local of crimes. As Professor Lino Graglia laments, with the “narrow exception” of “clearly noneconomic conduct that is not part of 
a larger regulatory scheme,” recent Commerce Clause cases “indicate[] a return to the Court’s practice since 1937 of reviewing purported 
exercises of the commerce power in name only.” Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 761, 784–85 (2008).
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sooner overcriminalization’s days will be numbered 
and the court system can resume the business of dis-
pensing justice instead of merely punishment.
Overcriminalization Defined
As the term implies, critiques of overcriminal-
ization posit that too many criminal laws are on the 
books today and, relatedly, that existing criminal 
prohibitions are too broad in scope. this standard 
view of overcriminalization is quantitative in that it 
bemoans the number of criminal laws on the books 
and the amount of activity that is deemed criminal.
Arguments that there is too much criminal law 
typically stress the fact that new criminal laws are 
continuously added to the books, even when crime 
rates are low or falling, and that the expansion 
often involves “regulatory” offenses. such offenses 
punish conduct that is mala prohibita, or wrong-
ful only because it is illegal, and may allow punish-
ment where “consciousness of wrongdoing be totally 
wanting.”11 With the continued proliferation of reg-
ulatory offenses, conduct that in prior generations 
might have resulted only in civil fines or tort liability 
(if that) is now subject to the stigma and punishment 
of criminal law.12
Although the quantitative view tends to domi-
nate discussions of overcriminalization, it is unsat-
isfying on its own terms. While such frequent use 
of the criminal sanction, especially during election 
years and times when crime rates are low or falling, 
may suggest that Congress is legislating for reasons 
other than legitimate public-safety needs, new crim-
inal legislation might be used, for example, to signal 
voters that its proponents are “tough” on crime.13 
Alternatively, steady expansion in the reach of fed-
eral crimes might signify that Congress does not see 
(or simply does not care much about) potential mis-
use of increasingly broad prosecutorial authority.14
still, a broad, constantly expanding criminal 
code need not jeopardize individual liberty or mete 
out morally undeserved punishment. If the prohibi-
tions and penalties are carefully tailored to appro-
priate offenses and offenders, a large, expanding 
code can operate as justly as a code that is smaller 
and more targeted in its reach. For this reason, the 
quantitative objection to overcriminalization is, 
without more, incomplete.
the quantitative objection implies a deeper, 
qualitative objection to overcriminalization in that 
overcriminalization tends to degrade the quality of 
the criminal code, producing unjust outcomes. For 
example, a code that is too large and grows too rap-
idly will often be poorly organized, structured, and 
conceived. the crimes may not be readily accessible 
or comprehensible to those who are subject to their 
commands. Moreover, a sprawling, rapidly growing 
criminal code likely contains inadequately defined 
crimes—crimes, for example, in which the conduct 
(actus reus) and state of mind (mens rea) elements 
are incompletely fleshed out, giving unintended and 
perhaps unwarranted sweep to those crimes.
the number and reach of criminal laws may be 
symptomatic of a broken criminal justice system, 
but the poor quality of the criminal code and the 
resulting mismatch between moral culpability and 
criminal liability are the disease.
11. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). As Dotterweich further explained, regulatory offenses employ criminal penalties as 
a form of regulation to promote the effectiveness of health, safety, and welfare rules otherwise enforced through noncriminal means. See 
id. at 280–81. Regulatory offenses differ from the types of crimes punishable at common law, which were deemed mala in se, or wrong in 
themselves, and typically involved infringements of personal or property rights of others.
12. The fact that regulatory offenses are punished criminally increases the number of federal criminal offenses immeasurably. Although 4,000 
to 5,000 federal statutory provisions carry criminal penalties, the total number of federal criminal offenses is well in excess of 10,000 when 
regulatory offenses are taken into account. As Professor Baker has explained, counting the many thousands of federal administrative rules and 
regulations that can be enforced criminally would add “an additional 10,000 or so crimes” to the total. Baker, supra note 8.
13. As the late Professor William Stuntz has explained: “Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher sentences 
(overlapping crimes are one way to make sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful 
the past two decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’” 
Stuntz, supra note 6, at 509. Although he credits tough-on-crime politics as an important factor in overcriminalization, his larger point is that 
deeper forces of institutional cooperation drive legislators repeatedly to expand criminal liability and penalties because those actions benefit 
prosecutors, who are legislators’ natural allies on issues of criminal justice. See id. at 509–11.
14. In other words, Congress might take what Paul Larkin refers to as a “trust us” approach to criminal lawmaking. As he explains: “The ‘trust us’ 
argument is that the law should be willing to allow overbreadth in criminal statutes because the courts and the public can rely, as Justices 
Holmes and Frankfurter once noted, on the ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers.’” Paul Larkin, The Dangers of a “Trust Us” 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 93, at 2 (June 12, 2013).
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Overcriminalization as a (Partially)  
Self-Inflicted Judicial Wound
Once overcriminalization’s qualitative aspects 
are understood, it becomes evident that the blame 
for overcriminalization cannot be laid entirely at 
Congress’s doorstep. Regrettably, the courts have 
played the overcriminalization game with Con-
gress and the Department of Justice. they have 
done so by expansively interpreting ambiguous 
criminal statutes in derogation of the venerable 
“rule of lenity” and by not insisting on mens rea 
requirements robust enough to rule out morally 
undeserved punishment. Both of these interpre-
tive failures have made federal criminal law even 
broader and more punitive.
Expansive Interpretations as Judicial Crime 
Creation. It is often said that courts do not “create” 
federal crimes, but that simply is not the case. When 
courts expand the reach of ambiguous criminal laws 
(laws which, by definition, can reasonably be read 
to include or exclude the defendant’s conduct), they 
are essentially creating crimes. they are determin-
ing for themselves, within the broad bounds of the 
terms of an ambiguous statute, whether the defen-
dant’s conduct should be condemned as criminal, 
and they are doing so after the fact, without prior 
warning to the defendant charged with a violation. 
to allow citizens to be convicted and imprisoned 
based on such judicial determinations transforms 
federal criminal law into what one scholar has 
described as “a species of federal common law”15—
a result fundamentally at odds with the principle 
that in a democracy, the criminalization decision is 
reserved for legislatures.16
the root of the problem is that the courts are 
notoriously inconsistent in adhering to the rule of 
lenity. the rule of lenity requires a court to construe 
ambiguous criminal laws narrowly, in favor of the 
defendant,17 not to show lenience to lawbreakers, 
but to protect important societal interests against 
the many adverse consequences that the judicial 
expansion of crimes produces. these consequences 
include judicial usurpation of the legislative crime-
definition function, not to mention potential frus-
tration of legislative purpose and unfair surprise to 
persons convicted under vague statutes. the rule of 
lenity therefore reflects, as Judge Henry Friendly 
memorably said, a democratic society’s “instinctive 
distaste against men languishing in prison unless 
the lawmaker has clearly said they should.”18
More to the point, faithful adherence to the rule 
of lenity would require courts to counteract over-
criminalization. the rule would require courts to 
narrow the scope of ambiguous criminal laws, adopt-
ing expansive interpretations only if compelled by 
the statutory text. this would prevent prosecutors 
from exploiting the ambiguities of poorly defined 
federal crimes either to criminalize conduct that 
Congress has not specifically declared to be a crime 
or to redefine—or ratchet up the penalty for—crimes 
dealt with more specifically in other statutes. the 
rule of lenity would thus make poor crime definition 
an obstacle to—not a license for—more expansive 
applications of federal criminal law, remitting pros-
ecutors seeking more enforcement authority to the 
democratic process, not an unelected, unaccount-
able judiciary.
Regrettably, the federal courts treat the rule of 
lenity with suspicion and, at times, outright hostility. 
While sometimes faithfully applying the rule of len-
ity, the supreme Court has frequently either ignored 
lenity or dismissed it as a principle that applies only 
when legislative history and other interpretive prin-
ciples cannot give meaning to an ambiguous stat-
15. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 347.
16. This notion inheres in the “principle of legality.” Although legality is sometimes described as merely a rejection of judicial crime creation vel 
non, the principle reflects the broader notion that only legislatures are “politically competent to define crime.” John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, 
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971).
18. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 196, 209 (Chicago, 
1967)). The rule also has an important, albeit underappreciated, role in preventing courts from overriding legislative grading decisions. In 
a system with many overlapping criminal laws, broad interpretations of statutes can increase the penalties the legislature provided in laws 
specifically regulating a criminal act, potentially resulting in disproportionately severe punishment. See generally Smith, Proportionality and 
Federalization, supra note 10, at 934–44.
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ute.19 Indeed, the federal courts disregard the rule of 
lenity so frequently that it is questionable whether 
the rule of lenity can still be accurately described as 
a rule. As I have previously stated:
[t]he courts’ aversion to letting blameworthy 
conduct slip through the federal cracks has dra-
matically reversed the lenity presumption. the 
operative presumption in criminal cases today 
is that whenever the conduct in question is mor-
ally blameworthy, statutes should be broadly 
construed, in favor of the prosecution, unless the 
defendant’s interpretation is compelled by the 
statute…. the rule of lenity, in short, has been 
converted from a rule about the proper locus of 
lawmaking power in the area of crime into what 
can only be described as a “rule of severity.”20
the results of the judiciary’s haphazard adher-
ence to the rule of lenity are as predictable as 
they are misguided. Federal judges have repeat-
edly used ambiguous statutes as a basis for creat-
ing new federal crimes.21 they have also expanded 
the reach of overlapping federal crimes to drive up 
the punishment that Congress prescribed for com-
paratively minor federal crimes.22 the end result of 
such assaults on the rule of lenity is necessarily a 
broader and more punitive federal criminal law—a 
worsening of overcriminalization rather than 
an improvement.
Inadequate Mens Rea Requirements. the 
courts have done better—but only slightly—in flesh-
ing out the state-of-mind, or mens rea, requirements 
for federal criminal liability. As the supreme Court 
explained in Morissette v. United States,23 the concept 
of punishment based on acts alone without a culpa-
ble state of mind is “inconsistent with our philoso-
phy of criminal law.” In our system, crime is under-
stood as a “compound concept,” requiring both an 
“evil-doing hand” and an “evil-meaning mind.”24
19. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), exemplifies the dismissive treatment lenity usually receives in federal court. Faced with 
a statutory term that even the majority admitted had literally dozens of different dictionary meanings and no evidence of the meaning 
that Congress intended, the majority simply chose the one it preferred and in doing so brought the defendant under a strict and otherwise 
inapplicable mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg correctly saw an easy case for the rule of 
lenity, the majority dismissed the rule as irrelevant. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: “The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything 
from which aid can be derived…we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that 
there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Id. at 138–39 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of 
the Supreme Court’s schizophrenic case law on lenity, see Kahan, supra note 15, at 384–89.
20. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 926.
21. See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–908 (discussing examples). One notorious example is mail and 
wire fraud. Courts have cut the concept of “fraud” loose from its moorings in common-law notions of “fraud” and allowed prosecutors to 
substitute in its place all sorts of imaginative “intangible rights.” Beginning with bribery and kickbacks involving corrupt public officials and 
corporate self-dealing, the intangible-rights doctrine was steadily extended over decades to allow federal prosecution of a stunning array 
of misbehavior. This misbehavior involved breaches of contract, conflicts of interest, ethical lapses, and violations of workplace rules that 
otherwise would not be federal crimes and in some cases may not have been crimes at all. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: 
Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981). This 
area was wide open to federal prosecutors until the recent decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010), in which the Court 
invalidated the statute codifying the intangible-rights doctrine (18 U.S.C. § 1346) as void for vagueness as applied to wrongdoing other than 
bribery and kickbacks.
22. An example is extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), the Court expanded the 
concept of “extortion” to include the passive acceptance of bribes and gratuities by public officials. The result was a dramatic increase in the 
maximum punishment available under other federal statutes regulating bribery and gratuities offenses. The maximum punishment for bribery 
and gratuities qua extortion is 20 years, far in excess of the then-applicable maximum for “honest services” mail fraud (five years, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (1992)) and the applicable maximums under the federal program bribery statute (10 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 666) and the federal bribery 
statute (15 years for bribery and two years for gratuities, see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c)). See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 
supra note 10, at 908–30 (discussing situations in which courts expanded overlapping crimes in ways that increased the penalty available 
under other statutes).
23. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
24. Id. at 251. Notice that, Morissette’s colorful reference to the “evil-doing hand” notwithstanding, the actus reus often is innocuous conduct. For 
example, the actus reus of mail fraud is simply using the mails, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the actus reus under the Travel Act includes interstate 
or international travel, see U.S.C. § 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). The blameworthiness of such crimes comes entirely from mens rea—in the examples 
just given, the illicit purpose for which the mails or channels of commerce are used. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (intent to defraud); id. § 1952(a) 
(intent to commit crimes).
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the historic role of the mens rea requirement is to 
exempt from punishment those who are not “blame-
worthy in mind” and thereby to limit punishment to 
persons who disregarded notice that their conduct 
was wrong.25 Mens rea also serves to achieve pro-
portionality of punishment for blameworthy acts, 
ensuring that the punishment the law allows “fits” 
the crime committed by the accused. Mens rea, for 
example, guarantees that the harsher penalties for 
intentional homicides will not be applied to acciden-
tal homicides.26
Despite the critical importance of mens rea to 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of federal criminal 
law, federal crimes often lack sufficient mens rea ele-
ments. Many federal crimes, including serious crimes, 
contain no express mens rea requirements.27 Perhaps 
more commonly, federal crimes include express mens 
rea requirements for some element of the crime but 
are silent as to the mens rea (if any) required for the 
other elements.28 Here it is evident that Congress 
intended to require mens rea but unclear whether 
Congress intended the express mens rea requirement 
to exclude additional mens rea requirements. In still 
other situations, even when Congress includes mens 
rea terms in the definition of crimes, it uses terms 
such as “willfully” and “maliciously” that have no 
intrinsic meaning and whose meaning varies widely 
in different statutory contexts.29
this confusing state of affairs might be accept-
able if the courts employed a consistent method of 
mens rea selection. However, the courts have been 
inconsistent in their approach to mens rea ques-
tions. On occasion, the supreme Court stands ready 
to read mens rea requirements into statutes that are 
silent in whole or in part as to mens rea because the 
Court has an interest in making a morally culpable 
state of mind a prerequisite to punishment.30 this, 
however, is not invariably so.
sometimes, courts treat legislative silence con-
cerning mens rea as a legislative signal to dispense 
with traditional mens rea requirements, especially 
with respect to regulatory crimes protecting the 
public health, safety, and welfare. Even Morissette v. 
United States, with its strong emphasis on the usual 
25. 342 U.S. at 252.
26. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 133–35 (2009) (hereinafter Smith, Proportional Mens Rea). As a 
consequence, the role of mens rea “is broader than exempting morally blameless conduct from punishment. It involves limiting guilt and 
punishment in accordance with the blameworthiness of the defendant’s act. The means of doing so differs. In some cases, mens rea serves to 
carve morally innocent conduct out of the reach of a criminal statute whereas, in others, it ensures that morally blameworthy conduct will not 
be punished out of proportion with its level of blameworthiness; in still others, it does both. The goal, however, is the same: to ensure that guilt 
and punishment track the moral blameworthiness of the conduct that gives rise to liability.” Id. at 136.
27. To give but two examples, the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), construed in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), makes it a 
serious felony to possess unregistered grenades and other “firearms” but contains no express mens rea requirements. Similarly, the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), makes it a crime to commit extortion, defined as obtaining money or property from another, with his consent, through the 
wrongful use of coercion, id. § 1951(b)(2). No mens rea requirements appear in the definition of the crime.
28. The false statement statute, for example, requires that the false statement have been made “knowingly and willfully” but provides no mens rea 
requirement for the part of the crime requiring that the false statement have been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Similarly, the federal child-pornography law requires that the defendant “knowingly” transported or received a visual 
depiction but prescribes no mens rea either for the sexually explicit nature of the visual depiction or for the fact that it involved minors. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a).
29. According to the Brown Commission, known more formally as the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, federal criminal 
statutes contain a “staggering array” of mens rea terms, and “there is no discernible pattern or consistent rationale which explains why one 
crime is defined or understood to require one mental state and another crime another mental state or indeed no mental state at all.”  
1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 119–20 (1970). For example, “willfulness” has a chameleon-
like quality in federal criminal law: “The word ‘willfully’ is sometimes said to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction is often 
dependent on the context in which it appears. Most obviously it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in the criminal 
law…a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (citations omitted).
30. A good example is Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). In that case, the defendant was convicted for possession of an unregistered 
machine gun despite his claimed ignorance of his rifle’s ability to fire automatically. To the prosecution, all that mattered was that he knew 
his rifle was a gun. The Court disagreed. In our gun-friendly culture in which handguns and long guns are lawful possessions in millions of 
households, mere knowledge that one is in possession of a firearm fails to give notice of a potential criminal violation. In order for the requisite 
culpable mental state to exist, the Court ruled, the government must prove the defendant knew the specific characteristic of his gun (in 
Staples, its automatic-firing capability) that placed it in the category of “quasi-suspect” weapons as to which citizens can reasonably expect 
legal regulation.
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requirement that a culpable mental state is a pre-
requisite to punishment, conceded that the require-
ment may not apply to regulatory or other crimes not 
derived from the common law.31 the Court seized on 
this statement in United States v. Freed32 as justifica-
tion for treating a felony punishable by 10 years in 
prison as a regulatory offense requiring no morally 
culpable mental state.
to be sure, more recent cases cast doubt on Moris-
sette and Freed in this respect. Among these cases 
are Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,33 Ratzlaf 
v. United States,34 and Staples v. United States.35 In 
each case, the supreme Court adopted heightened 
mens rea requirements, and Arthur Andersen and 
Ratzlaf went so far as to make ignorance of the law 
a defense.36 Each time, the Court ratcheted up mens 
rea requirements for the stated purpose of prevent-
ing conviction for morally blameless conduct.
these cases, I believe, are best read as making a 
culpable mental state a prerequisite for punishment 
for all crimes, even regulatory offenses. As I have 
explained elsewhere:
[t]he supreme Court has dramatically revital-
ized the mens rea requirement for federal crimes. 
the “guilty mind” requirement now aspires to 
exempt all “innocent” (or morally blameless) 
conduct from punishment and restrict criminal 
statutes to conduct that is “inevitably nefarious.” 
When a literal interpretation of a federal crimi-
nal statute could encompass “innocent” behavior, 
courts stand ready to impose heightened mens rea 
requirements designed to exempt all such behav-
ior from punishment. the goal of current federal 
mens rea doctrine, in other words, is nothing short 
of protecting moral innocence against the stigma 
and penalties of criminal punishment.37
the fact remains, however, that Freed and cases 
like it have never been overturned. unless that hap-
pens, confusion will persist, as will the possibility 
that a culpable mental state may not be required for 
some crimes, especially regulatory offenses involv-
ing health and safety concerns.
One thing, however, is certain: As long as courts 
fail to make proof of a culpable mental state an 
unyielding prerequisite to punishment, federal 
prosecutors will continue to water down mens rea 
requirements in ways that allow conviction in excess 
of blameworthiness. that is exactly what prosecu-
tors did in Arthur Andersen during the wave of post-
Enron hysteria over corporate fraud. In seeking to 
convict Enron’s accounting firm of the “corrupt per-
suasion” form of obstruction of justice, prosecutors—
flatly disregarding the lesson of cases like Staples 
and Ratzlaf—argued for incredibly weak mens rea 
requirements that, as the Court noted, would have 
criminalized entirely innocuous conduct.38
31. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). As unfortunate as Morissette’s dictum was in this respect, the Court had previously 
held that the category of regulatory offenses that Morissette later referred to as “public welfare offenses” “dispenses with the conventional 
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
32. 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (noting that common-law crimes belong to a “different category” than the “expanding regulatory area involving 
activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare” as to which relaxed mens rea requirements apply).
33. 544 U.S. 696 (2000).
34. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
35. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
36. Arthur Andersen held that ordering the destruction of documents to keep them out of the hands of federal investigators cannot be considered 
“knowing corruption” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) unless the person who gave the order knew he was acting illegally. See Arthur 
Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706. Staples, as previously explained, ruled that a person does not knowingly possess an unregistered “firearm” unless 
he knew the precise characteristics of the weapon that classified it as a “firearm” subject to federal registration requirements. See supra 
note 30. Ratzlaf held that to be guilty of “willfully” violating a prohibition of evading currency transaction reporting requirements by breaking 
down a cash transaction in excess of $10,000 into smaller transactions, the prosecution must prove the accused knew that such “structuring” 
activity is illegal. See Ratlzaf, 510 U.S. at 149.
37. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 127 (footnotes omitted); see generally John S. Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: 
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021 (1999).
38. The government’s interpretation would have made it a crime either to withhold documents from federal investigators or to destroy documents 
pursuant to the sort of document-retention policies that are commonplace in the business world, even if the person responsible for 
nondisclosure or destruction honestly believed he was acting lawfully and even if the person was reasonably unaware that the documents 
pertained to a federal investigation. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705–08.
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Although the supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the Justice Department’s efforts and over-
turned Arthur Andersen’s conviction, the firm has 
less cause to celebrate than one might think. After 
being convicted on a prosecution theory so aggres-
sive that it could not win even a single vote from the 
Justices, the firm—once a Big Five accounting firm—
went out of the consulting business. Even now that 
it no longer stands convicted of a crime, its reputa-
tion has likely been damaged beyond repair. Its own 
conduct in the Enron matter had a lot to do with that, 
of course, but so did the overzealousness of federal 
prosecutors in exploiting the serious imperfections 
in federal mens rea doctrine. the Arthur Andersen 
episode simultaneously shows the need for substan-
tial mens rea reform and the high cost of not having 
strong mens rea requirements.
The Judicial Path to  
Overcriminalization Reform
given that overcriminalization has qualitative 
components—for which courts themselves bear a 
large share of the blame—courts can be part of the 
solution instead of part of the problem. Even if Con-
gress and federal prosecutors continue their unre-
strained use of the criminal sanction, courts are not 
powerless to act.
the solution is for courts to interpret statutes in 
ways that rectify the qualitative defects that over-
criminalization produces in a body of criminal law 
as sprawling and poorly defined as federal crimi-
nal law is. New interpretive strategies, tailored to 
the troubling realities of a criminal justice system 
characterized by rampant overcriminalization, 
can help to right this fundamental wrong in federal 
criminal law.39
statutory construction, of course, has its limits 
and cannot be used to defeat the operation of stat-
utes that plainly encompass the defendant’s conduct. 
In cases such as these, courts should apply the stat-
utes as written, barring some constitutional infir-
mity, but even here courts can exercise informed 
discretion to counteract abusive exercises of pros-
ecutorial discretion.
After United States v. Booker,40 district judges have 
wide sentencing discretion, and they can and should 
use that discretion to show suitable lenience toward 
sympathetic defendants. the President can also use 
his power to grant pardons or commute sentences—
as President Barack Obama recently did to free eight 
prisoners serving unduly long drug sentences in the 
wake of the Fair sentencing Act of 201041—to do jus-
tice toward defendants who were unfairly convicted 
or sentenced.42 Although these important safeguards 
for the sound administration of criminal justice 
should not be overlooked, this paper focuses on how 
courts can interpret criminal statutes to counteract 
the effects of overcriminalization.
Restoring the Rule of Lenity to Its Rightful 
Place. In light of how often courts interpret crimi-
nal statutes expansively, it should be clear that they 
do not simply let the weights in the interpretive 
scales determine whether statutes are to be read 
broadly or narrowly, as academic critics of lenity 
would have them do.43 Instead, the balance is heav-
ily skewed in favor of the prosecution when the con-
duct in question is morally blameworthy, even when 
a broad interpretation allows prosecutors to drive 
up considerably the punishment that would other-
wise apply or to evade limitations that the legisla-
ture included in the definition of the crime in more 
specific statutes.
39. For a more detailed discussion of these and other potential judicial reform measures, see Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 537, 578–89 (2012).
40. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
41. See David Jackson, Obama Commutes 8 Crack Cocaine Sentences, USA Today (Dec. 19, 2013). The grant of executive clemency, unusual for 
the Obama Administration, came a year after stunning press reports and calls for investigations concerning misconduct in the Office of the 
Pardon Attorney resulting in critical evidence supporting clemency being withheld from the White House. See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, Pardon 
Attorney Torpedoes Plea for Presidential Mercy, ProPublica (May 30, 2012). (In the interest of full disclosure, the author signed a joint letter of 
criminal law and procedure professors calling for an investigation into the Office of the Pardon Attorney.)
42. See Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 593 (2012). For a similar argument in the 
context of capital offenses, see Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 319–27 (2008).
43. See Kahan, supra note 15, at 425; Jeffries, supra note 16, at 189.
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Whether the law enforcement need for expanded 
authority is real,44 minimal,45 or just silly,46 the one 
constant seems to be that courts will go to almost 
any lengths to keep blameworthy conduct from slip-
ping through the federal cracks. thus, it is closer to 
the truth to say that the operative interpretive rule 
in federal criminal cases is severity: that ambiguous 
statutes presumptively should be construed broad-
ly to prevent culpable defendants from slipping 
through the federal cracks.
In practice, then, rejecting the rule of lenity tends 
to look a lot like endorsing anti-lenity (or a rule of 
severity). that, in turn, affords a substantial justifi-
cation for taking lenity seriously, even if, as a theo-
retical matter, an evenhanded approach to the inter-
pretation of criminal statutes might be preferable to 
a strict-construction default. After all, even critics 
of lenity do not contend that criminal laws should 
always be interpreted broadly, recognizing that 
sometimes courts should narrow the reach of crimi-
nal statutes.47
the obvious assumption is that there is a viable 
interpretive middle ground between the lenity side 
of the spectrum (in which ambiguous statutes are 
always construed narrowly) and the anti-lenity or 
severity side of the spectrum (in which such stat-
utes are always construed broadly). this assump-
tion is quite difficult to reconcile with the courts’ 
rather checkered track record in interpreting fed-
eral crimes.48 given that courts often miss valid rea-
sons for narrowly construing statutes, a consistently 
applied rule of lenity under which every ambiguous 
criminal statute is read narrowly is the right inter-
pretive rule.
the political economy of criminal law confirms 
that lenity is the right interpretive default. the rel-
evant question is which interpretive rule would give 
Congress proper incentives to make its intentions 
clear concerning the scope and meaning of crimi-
nal statutes. to the extent that legislatures gener-
ally share prosecutors’ desire for broad criminal 
prohibitions,49 a rigidly enforced rule of lenity would 
operate as an information-forcing default rule, giv-
ing Congress added incentives to make its wishes 
known ex ante.
Additionally, once an ambiguity arises in particu-
lar settings, as it often does, the question is whether 
the Department of Justice or groups favoring crimi-
nal justice reform are in the best position to convince 
Congress to pass new legislation resolving the inter-
pretive question. the Justice Department—the 800-
pound gorilla in federal criminal law—is undoubt-
edly best suited to the task of overcoming legislative 
inertia. As Professor Einer Elhauge explains, “there 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (allowing the federal racketeering statute to be used against corrupt “enterprises” 
without any effort by racketeers to infiltrate legitimate businesses); see generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 
909–11 (discussing implications of Turkette for federal efforts to eradicate organized crime).
45. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a case in point. There the defendant sought to trade a machine gun for drugs. He was convicted 
of multiple drug offenses and presumably could have been convicted of any number of serious firearms offenses as well. Suffice it to say 
that there was no danger that he or others who purchase drugs with guns (much less machine guns) would slip through the federal cracks. 
The prosecutor, however, argued that exchanging guns for drugs constitutes “use…of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
offense” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). One would think that such barter is not a terribly significant problem: Even if trading guns for 
drugs is common (which is far from self-evident), it would surely be the rare drug dealer whose access to firearms depends on bartering 
customers. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the ordinary meaning of “using a gun” (which connotes employment as a weapon) and endorsed 
the “universal view of the courts of appeals” that the statute encompasses barter with as well as more lethal “uses” of guns. 508 U.S. at 
233. That the Court stretched the statute to convict is all the more remarkable given the draconian penal consequences of its interpretation: 
Having bartered with a machine gun, Smith faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years, to run consecutively with his underlying drug 
convictions. See id. at 227.
46. In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), the Court watered down the mens rea required to convict under the federal bank robbery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, to “permit the statute to reach cases…where an ex-convict robs a bank [without any intent to abscond with the 
loot] because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison.” Id. at 271. The reader will be forgiven for regarding this as a solution in 
desperate search of a problem.
47. For example, Professor Dan Kahan asserts that “federal criminal statutes should not uniformly be read either narrowly or broadly, but rather 
appropriately so as to carry out their purposes and to realize the full range of benefits associated with delegated lawmaking.” Kahan, supra 
note 15, at 426; see generally Jeffries, supra note 16, at 220–21 (identifying situations in which criminal laws should be interpreted narrowly).
48. See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–930 (demonstrating that federal courts often expand the reach of 
criminal laws in spite of strong grounds for interpreting them narrowly).
49. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 534–35 (describing legislatures and prosecutors as “natural allies”).
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is no effective lobby for narrowing criminal stat-
utes,” whereas “an overly narrow interpretation is 
far more likely to be corrected…because prosecu-
tors and other members of anti-criminal lobbying 
groups are heavily involved in legislative drafting 
and can more readily get on the legislative agenda.”50 
strict adherence to the rule of lenity would thus put 
the burden of overcoming legislative inertia on the 
shoulders of the party in the best position to per-
suade Congress to act.
Finally, a reinvigorated rule of lenity would pro-
mote the more effective operation of prosecuto-
rial restraint. When courts stand ready to expand 
ambiguous criminal laws to keep blameworthy 
offenders from slipping through the cracks in fed-
eral criminal law, prosecutors can safely “push the 
envelope” and stretch vague laws to their outer limit. 
As long as they target blameworthy offenders—and, 
disturbingly, even if they do not51—prosecutors can 
be confident that courts will ratify their broad read-
ings of criminal laws.
Lenity would dramatically change the calcu-
lus by lowering the prosecution’s likelihood of con-
viction, giving prosecutors greater incentives to 
decline prosecution in cases of blameless or mar-
ginally blameworthy offenders potentially guilty 
only of hypertechnical, victimless crimes—the kind 
of offenders who tend to become ensnared in the 
overcriminalization net. the administration of jus-
tice in federal prosecutions, therefore, would vastly 
improve if federal courts started taking the rule of 
lenity seriously.
Proportionality-Based Approaches to Statu-
tory Construction. If federal judges remain fick-
le in their adherence to the rule of lenity despite 
its obvious advantages, they should at least take 
into account the potential sentencing consequenc-
es before expanding the reach of a criminal stat-
ute. this inquiry would require courts to look past 
the facts of the cases before them, hypothesize the 
range of potential applications of the statute,52 and 
pay close attention to the penal consequences of 
an expansive interpretation. In cases in which an 
expansive interpretation would threaten to visit dis-
proportionate punishment on convicted offenders, 
as determined against the baseline of other criminal 
laws (state or federal) proscribing the same criminal 
act, a narrow reading is the appropriate response 
unless the statute’s plain meaning commands a 
broader interpretation.53
Proportionality considerations should also be 
factored into mens rea selection. the supreme Court 
should repudiate the notion that avoiding convic-
tion for morally blameless conduct is the only goal 
of mens rea doctrine.54 A separate, equally vital and 
proper concern of mens rea doctrine is to ensure that 
50. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2194 (2002). One might wonder what the point of enforcing 
lenity would be if Congress can be counted upon to repeal decisions narrowing the reach of criminal statutes. The fact, however, is that 
Congress does not reflexively ride to the rescue of federal prosecutors handed interpretive defeats in court. According to a leading study of 
congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions, Congress lets stand the vast majority (80 percent) of narrow interpretations of federal 
criminal statutes. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 351 tbl. 19 
(1991). This is cause for optimism about the potential for lenity to make serious inroads on overcriminalization.
51. Even though moral culpability is an essential prerequisite to punishment, judges (many of whom are themselves former prosecutors) may 
tend to defer excessively to the judgment of prosecutors that an offender is blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment. Such misplaced 
deference undoubtedly explains why the many sympathetic defendants whose stories have been cataloged by The Heritage Foundation and 
the Criminal Law Reform Group were found guilty in spite of their blamelessness. See supra notes 1–2 & 5.
52. This hypothetical inquiry is exactly how the Supreme Court decides federal mens rea issues. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of 
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1999) (explaining that courts deciding such issues start by 
asking “as a hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could violate [the statute]”).
53. Pleas for proportionality of punishment inevitably encounter the objection that it is impossible to determine when, objectively speaking, 
punishments are proportional. Although familiar, the objection is misplaced. Proportionality serves as a judicially manageable legal 
standard in a variety of other contexts, such as determining the excessiveness of terms of imprisonment and of punitive-damages awards, 
and proportionality is used by legislatures and judges alike in grading offenses and sentencing offenders. See Smith, Proportionality and 
Federalization, supra note 10, at 891–92 (citing cases). Taking proportionality considerations into account is no more perilous in interpreting 
federal crimes than in these other contexts, especially if the proportionality inquiry is grounded in a comparison with the penalties other laws 
provide for a particular crime and is used only as an interpretive principle (as opposed to a standard of constitutionality).
54. In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), for example, the Court declared that mens rea doctrine “requires a court to read into a statute 
only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” Id. at 269.
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the sanctions available in the event of conviction 
will be proportional to the blameworthiness of con-
victed offenders.55
Imposing punishment in excess of blameworthi-
ness is just as offensive in principle as convicting 
blameless conduct: Either way, courts are imposing 
punishment that is not justified by the culpability of 
the offender and gambling with the moral credibil-
ity of the criminal law. Crimes for which Congress 
has prescribed severe penalties should require cor-
respondingly high levels of mens rea so that offend-
ers will be seriously blameworthy. Only then will 
convicted offenders be morally deserving of the stiff 
penalties that federal law affords.
Reinvigorate Mens Rea Requirements. Final-
ly, courts should substantially overhaul federal mens 
rea doctrine. Quite simply, the doctrine is in dire 
need of reform both in its underlying theory and 
in its operational details. For the stated purpose of 
preventing punishment for morally blameless (or 
“innocent”) conduct,56 the supreme Court has made 
“innocence protection” the driving force in mens rea 
selection. Heightened mens rea requirements can 
and should be imposed where (and only where) a 
federal criminal statute would otherwise potential-
ly reach morally blameless conduct.57
In addition to making disproportionate punish-
ment a proper concern of mens rea doctrine, courts 
should free the prevailing federal method of select-
ing mens rea from the shackles that prevent it from 
achieving its important goal of aligning punishment 
and blameworthiness. Once courts detect a poten-
tial innocence-protection problem—understood not 
just as the potential for punishment of blameless 
acts, but also as disproportionate punishment for 
blameworthy acts—the courts should impose what-
ever heightened mens rea requirement is necessary to 
limit punishment in accordance with blameworthi-
ness. In doing so, courts should not be at all reluctant 
to require, where necessary to avoid morally unde-
served punishment, prosecutors to prove knowledge 
that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal.
this more robust mens rea doctrine could be the 
single most important contribution the courts could 
make to avoiding the qualitative problems associ-
ated with overcriminalization. Overcriminaliza-
tion horror stories typically involve prosecutors 
using obscure regulatory laws as traps for unwary 
citizens who are understandably unaware either 
of the existence or the meaning of the law in ques-
tion.58 to the extent that judges start demanding 
proof in these cases, not only of the facts that make 
the defendants’ conduct illegal, but also of the defen-
dants’ knowledge that they were breaking the law, 
prosecutors could no longer count on guilty pleas or 
guilty verdicts.
the effect would not simply prevent unjust pun-
ishment, although that is a worthy goal in its own 
right. It would also give the federal government 
much-needed incentives either to give the regulated 
public notice that such obscure crimes exist, thereby 
enabling itself to prove knowing illegality, or, as one 
scholar helpfully suggests,59 to use administrative or 
civil enforcement mechanisms in place of criminal 
55. For an extensive argument along this line, see Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26.
56. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000); see generally Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 131 (“The Supreme 
Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined in terms that guarantee a path to acquittal for morally blameless conduct and has 
increasingly looked to the mental element of crimes to provide this protection against punishment for ‘innocent’ conduct.”).
57. “Where the nature of the prohibited act, as defined by Congress, is sufficient to guarantee that anyone convicted of the crime will be morally 
blameworthy, courts treat the legislative definition of the crime as conclusive and do not impose heightened mens rea requirements. If, 
however, the prohibited act is not ‘inevitably nefarious’ and thus could potentially reach innocent conduct, courts adopt more stringent mens 
rea requirements designed to exclude all innocent conduct from the crime’s reach.” Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 130. See, 
e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2000); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135 (1994).
58. For a collection of cases in which this has occurred, see, e.g., The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization,  
http://www.overcriminalized.com/CaseStudy.aspx (last visited May 28, 2014). The website does not mince words, describing the case 
studies as “documented stories of good people whose lives were impacted by overcriminalization: criminal laws that are overbroad or flat-out 
ridiculous, prosecutors and prosecutions that are over-zealous, and sentences that are harsh, unreasonable, and unjust. The lives of some 
were shattered when they were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned for doing things no one would think are crimes. Others did an act that 
could be considered wrongful, but did so unintentionally—without ‘criminal intent’ (what lawyers call mens rea)—and should not have been 
charged, convicted, or punished.” Id.
59. See Darryl Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 657, 677–82 (2011).
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prosecutions to achieve the government’s regulato-
ry goals. In a free society, criminal prosecution—the 
most coercive and stigmatizing exercise of govern-
mental authority—should be a last resort, reserved 
for cases in which the government’s legitimate regu-
latory goals cannot otherwise be achieved.
Conclusion
As this brief survey of federal criminal law has 
shown, overcriminalization is a serious problem in 
the federal system and more generally for Ameri-
can criminal law. the number and scope of criminal 
laws, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. ultimate-
ly, overcriminalization is so problematic because it 
tends to degrade the quality of criminal codes and 
result in unwarranted punishment, jeopardizing the 
quality of justice the system generates. While over-
criminalization is the order of the day in the federal 
system, rendering the legislature no longer supreme 
in matters of crime and punishment, it is ultimately 
prosecutors who exploit incompletely defined crimes 
and the redundancy of the criminal code to expand 
the scope of their enforcement power and ratchet up 
the punishment that convicted defendants face.
As judges decry this state of affairs and scholars 
hope against hope for bold legislative or constitu-
tional solutions, they have missed something criti-
cal. given that the federal courts helped to make fed-
eral criminal law as broad and punitive as it is, there 
is a ready solution to overcriminalization’s many 
problems short of legislative self-restraint or judi-
cial activism in the name of the Constitution.
the solution is for federal judges to approach their 
vital interpretive functions with keen sensitivity to 
the many adverse effects that overcriminalization 
and the courts’ current, self-defeating interpretive 
strategies create for federal criminal law. If courts 
cease giving unwarranted scope to ambiguous crim-
inal laws and redouble their efforts to use mens rea 
requirements to rule out morally undeserved pun-
ishment—understood not merely as punishment for 
blameless acts, but also as disproportionately severe 
punishment for blameworthy acts—overcriminal-
ization need not be the disaster that so many with 
good cause believe it to be.
—Stephen F. Smith is Professor of Law at the 
University of Notre Dame.
